Series Introduction

On 8 September 2025 the Government published the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) with the objective of strengthening the UK’s industrial capability to deliver upon the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The strategy sets out its plan across six priority outcomes:

  • Making Defence an Engine for Growth – see here
  • Backing UK Based Business – see here
  • Positioning the UK at the Leading Edge of Defence Innovation – see here
  • Developing a Resilient UK Industrial Base – see here
  • Transforming Procurement and Acquisition Systems – see here
  • Forging New and Enduring Partnerships

Members can read ADS’ initial briefing on the DIS here, which provides an overview of the strategy.

Introduction

The UK cannot adequately face all our threats by acting alone. Our strength lies in the partnerships we forge, not just those internationally but also those within our own borders. The DIS attempts to capture this, from re-energising NATO ties to reshaping how government works with industry, trade unions, academia and investors at home. If delivered well, these partnerships should unlock innovation and resilience across the UK.

International Partnerships

Ever since the SDR, the Government has been brandishing a NATO First placard. The sentiment is loud enough, but clarity has been lacking: what does it actually mean for a defence policy to be NATO First? In its submission to the DIS ADS had asked Government to not only restate the principle but articulate how it translates into practical industrial choices. In what proved a marked disappointment in ADS’ eyes the DIS shed no light on the policy of ‘NATO First’.

For ADS, a genuine NATO First posture requires the UK to fully leverage existing frameworks, networks and industrial support structures; particularly the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) which could help the Government in leveraging the relationships between allied industry and NATO bodies. These mechanisms are already well developed, and the DIS could have gone further in signalling how they will be systematically used to embed UK views and capabilities upstream. From these networks, the UK should be championing efforts to establish cohesive NATO architectures, shared standards and interoperable designs, essential not simply for operational effectiveness but for building a transatlantic industrial base capable of scaling collectively in times of crisis.

Yet the DIS is careful to remind us that “NATO First does not mean NATO only”. The UK’s bilateral and multilateral alliances remain central to capability development. On Europe, the DIS references the new UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, set at the 2025 Summit, as the basis for closer consultation and joint investment. ADS had strongly encouraged Government to pursue a more formal UK-EU defence and security pact, recognising that divergence between the two industrial bases weakens both. It finally creates a channel through which the UK can explore participation in initiatives. But the DIS provides little sense of pace or priority. Subsequently, it has been disappointing that the UK has not negotiated access to EU SAFE, and the UK is therefore still waiting to see how the new UK-EU Partnership will materialise.

When it comes to the United States, the DIS rightly highlights the scale and depth of the UK-US defence relationship and the export successes that come with it. AUKUS represents a generational opportunity to deepen industrial integration. While collaboration with Washington offers technological advantage, the UK must also protect its industrial competitiveness and ensure that participation in US programmes strengthens domestic capability and does not prevent collaboration with other partners. A NATO First strategy that becomes a US-first procurement pipeline would fail both tests.

To its credit, the DIS sets firm commitments to deliver NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) an important signal that the UK is serious about shifting NATO from design to delivery. But delivery, as ever, remains key. Industrial partnerships are only meaningful if they lead to contracts on desks, roadmaps with funding behind them and programmes that move at the pace the threat demands – the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) will therefore need to reflect this.

Domestic Partnerships – A whole of Society Approach

With the ever-growing talk of NATO and bilaterals echoing through the halls of Whitehall, it must not be forgotten that some of the strongest partnerships will need to be forged inside the boarders of the UK. Critical to the DIS is its ambition for a whole-of-society approach to defence and resilience between government, industry, labour, finance and academia. The clearest expression of this was the creation of the Defence Industrial Joint Council (DIJC). Launched earlier this year, the DIJC is positioned as the Government’s primary mechanism for forging a new partnership with industry.

The DIJC’s early meetings have shown positive intent, particularly in its commitment to shape implementation of DIS recommendations and to interrogate barriers to scaling, resilience and supply-chain fragility. However, ADS believes the real test will be whether this forum can shift long standing behaviours across the system. The risk is that it becomes another venue for discussion rather than a driver of decisive action. Delivery mechanisms such as sprint groups must therefore be empowered to produce tangible outcomes; especially where reforms touch sensitive issues such as data-sharing, commercial openness and industrial prioritisation.

The Government signals an intent to expand the use of secondments, both bringing industry specialists into the MOD and giving civil servants exposure to commercial environments. However, ADS believes this must be structured, properly funded and scaled as a scattering of secondments will not shift institutional culture or strengthen partnerships.

A genuine whole-of-society approach also requires rebuilding a national narrative that restores public understanding of defence and security as a shared responsibility. It should also answer why defence matters, not only for security, but for economic resilience, technological leadership and the protection of our values. As Government prepares the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill, it must consider the legal tools required to mobilise industry, workforces and supply-chains in times of crisis. If designed well, it could turn the rhetoric of readiness into real national resilience; if not, the UK risks entering the next decade strategically underpowered.

At the same time, Government’s pledge to strengthen ties with adjacent industries, from automotive to advanced manufacturing, speaks to the scale of the challenge. If the UK is serious about readiness and rapid industrial mobilisation, then reaching into sectors that are not historically “defence” will be essential. ADS welcomes this recognition but notes that engagement must move beyond convening towards building genuine pathways for new entrants, dual-use innovators and specialist suppliers.

Conclusion

The DIS offers a broad vision for partnership, international and domestic, but too often stops at aspiration rather than actionable definition. Industry is ready to move, but progress now depends on turning policy intent into aligned standards, funded programmes and genuine burden-sharing. Ultimately, these partnerships are only as strong as the structures that sustain them.

Series Conclusion

Overall, the DIS was pragmatic in setting a framework for change, and early signs of implementation offer cautious encouragement. But the real test lies ahead: whether these commitments translate into delivery, pace and measurable improvement. The forthcoming DIP will reveal whether this strategy can truly move from policy to practice.